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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
The last two decades have witnessed a substantial
amount of research designed to investigate psychological
aspects of depression; in particular, the role of cognitive
factors has been a prominent focus

(Gotlib & McCabe, 1992).

Gotlib and McCabe (1992) claim that this increased interest
in cognitive aspects of depression is due mainly to Beck's
theory of depression.

Beck's model focuses on three aspects

of cognition commonly observed in depressed persons: the
"cognitive triad," cognitive distortions or faulty
information processing, and negative self-schemata (Beck,
1967

1976) •

I

The cognitive triad refers to the idea that depressed
individuals regard themselves, their futurer and their
experiences in an idiosyncratic, negative manner (Beck,
1983).

They view themselves as defective,

inadequate, or

deprived, often attributing unpleasant experiences to a
psychological, moral, or physical defect in themselves.
Also, depressed individuals exhibit a negative view of the
future, expecting their current difficulties to continue
indefinitely (Beck, 1983).

They anticipate hardship and

frustration, and they predict failure in future tasks.
addition, depressed persons have a tendency to interpret

In
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their experiences in a negative way, viewing the world as
making excessive demands and preventing them from reaching
their life goals (Beck, 1983).
According to Beck (1976), the second aspect of
cognition in depressed persons involves faulty information
processing, or cognitive distortions.

Depressed individuals

tend to draw negative conclusions about situations, to focus
on negative aspects of situations, and to exaggerate the
significance of negative experiences.

Finally, the third

aspect postulated by Beck (1976) states that depressed
persons exhibit negative schemas.

Schemas are cognitive

structures that consist of a person's fundamental beliefs
and assumptions (Beck & Weishaar, 1989).

Depressive schemas

are theorized to be rigid, consisting of inappropriate
beliefs or attitudes about the individual and the world, and
they often constitute perfectionistic standards by which the
individual judges him- or herself (Gotlib & McCabe, 1992)
These schematic beliefs can be latent, or outside of
conscious awareness, and they tend to be activated by
stressful environmental events.

Furthermore, according to

Beck, people who have negative schemas are more likely to
get depressed.

Thus, the affective, behavioral, and

physiological symptoms of depression are considered to be
consequences of schema-based negative information processing
(Gotlib & McCabe, 1992) .

In sum, particular ways of

processing information are theorized to cause depression.

3

Encoding Biases
Perception involves interpreting environmental stimuli
using existing knowledge structures (often described as
schemas) .

Human perceptual processes depend to a large

extent on learned, inferential encoding

11

rules" that impose

preexisting categories in order to interpret newly
encountered stimuli (Lewicki, Hill, & Sasaki, 1989)
Because stimuli frequently do not match the categories very
well, the role of preexisting categories or schemas may
become particularly important.

Perception depends not only

on the objective characteristics of the stimulus, but also
on the preexisting encoding rules or categories that the
perceiver uses to translate the stimulus into subjectively
meaningful terms.

These encoding processes have been

demonstrated in several studies using different stimulus
materials, including pattern recognition (e.g., Posner,
Goldsmith, & Welton, 1967) and person perception (e.g.,
Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982).

More recently, several

studies have focused on the nonconscious acguisition of
information from the environment and its influence on
ensuing encoding processes (Lewicki, 1986a, 1986b; Lewicki,
Hill, & Bizot, 1988).
Lewicki (1986b), for example, exposed participants to
slides of young women's faces paired with brief descriptions
of their personality.

The women differed in the length of

their hair (short vs. long), while the personality

4

descriptions either focused on the women's kindness or
capability.

There were two covariation conditions: Long-

haired women were described as kind while short-haired ones
as capable (condition I), or long-haired women were
identified as capable while short-haired ones as kind
(condition II).

Participants were exposed to either

condition during the learning phase of the study, and were
later asked about the kindness and capability of a different
set of stimulus persons.
Lewicki (1986b) hypothesized that, if the information
about the covariation was processed and registered during
the learning phase, this would result in an increase of
processing time for subsequent judgments containing
information relevant to the covariation (e.g., being asked
about the kindness of a long-haired woman in condition I).
This hypothesis is based on the reasoning that, when
individuals find and retrieve relevant information from
memory in trying to make judgments, the examination of that
information will increase response time (Glucksber &
Mccloskey, 1981; cited in Lewicki, l986b).
obtained conformed to this prediction.

The results

Although individuals

were unable to articulate the correct covariation between
the women's visual and personality characteristics when
interviewed after the task, they seemed to

~learn~

about

this co-occurrence and to use this knowledge in subsequent
judgments.

This learning was demonstrated in their

5

"correct" judgments of long-hair and short-hair women in
terms of kindness and capability ratings.
As a result of this inferential process at encoding,
the final representation of a stimulus that is encoded and
stored in memory consists of both

~objective~

features of

the stimulus (i.e., characteristics actually present in the
external world and directly perceived by the individual) and
"subjective" features

(i.e., characteristics not present or

not directly perceivable but inferred by the individual
using the inferential category)

(Lewicki et al., 1989).

Thus, from the example above, long hair would be considered
part of the objective stimulus, and the inference about
kindness or capability would be a subjective feature based
on the encoding process.

Furthermore, the human memory

system does not seem to distinguish inf erred characteristics
from directly perceived ones (Hill, Lewicki, Czyzewska, &
Boss, 1989; Hill, Lewicki, Czyzewska, & Schuller, 1990;
Lewicki et al., 1989).

As Hill, Lewicki, and Neubauer

(1991) note, an important implication of this phenomenon is
that inferential rules that control the encoding processes
can "fabricate'' self-supportive evidence.

Because the

encoding rules develop and become stronger as a function of
the amount of stimuli interpreted as consistent with the
rules (Lewicki et al., 1988), the lack of differentiation
between actually perceived and inferred elements implies
that encoding rules may gradually develop in a self-
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perpetuating manner (Lewicki et al., 1989).

Thus, for

example, long-haired women may be perceived as kind despite
objective, stimulus-bound evidence for this judgment.
Lewicki et al.

(1989) describe this occurrence as an

encoding "bias."
Studies of encoding biases.

Hill et al.

(1989)

investigated the process of encoding biases with different
stimulus materials, including matrices of digits and
silhouettes of persons.

Results indicated that participants

nonconsciously acquired an encoding bias during the learning
phase of the experiment, which increased in strength during
the testing phase as they made judgments for ambiguous
material (i.e., stimuli that were neither consistent nor
inconsistent with the covariation) .

Lewicki and his

colleagues (1989) examined this self-perpetuating process by
exposing participants to computer-generated brain diagrams,
in which the percentage of a particular character making up
the diagram covaried, in a nonconsciously-salient manner,
with a verbal description of the person.
brain diagrams contained either
character 178.

13~

Specifically,

or 17% of ASCII

During the learning phase of the study,

these diagrams were explicitly identified as intelligent or
not intelligent (i.e., 13% brain diagrams were identified as
intelligent and 17% diagrams as not intelligent for one half
of the participants, while the opposite covariation was true
for the remaining participants).

During the testing phase,

7

participants saw additional diagrams with no explicit
description and were asked to rate the intelligence of the
individuals to whom the brain scans belonged.
al.

(1989)

Lewicki et

found that participants rated "intelligent brain

scans" increasingly as more intelligent and

~nonintelligent

brains scans" increasingly as less intelligent, despite
participants' inability to articulate the nature of the
covariation.

These results suggest that participants

acquired the new encoding bias and that this bias became
stronger as they rated ambiguous material.
In addition, research findings indicate that the
encoding rules that develop through the self-perpetuation
process can be independent of or even inconsistent with the
individual's knowledge that can be articulated.
example, Hill, Lewicki, and Neubauer (1991)

For

interviewed

participants after the study and found that, despite the
accuracy of their ratings, participants were unable to
describe the actual covariation manipulated in the learning
phase, or gave incorrect reasons (e.g.,

~overall

shape 11 of

the brain scan) for their ratings.
The process of self-perpetuating encoding suggests
important implications for mental illness.

Specifically,

this process may contribute to the development of erroneous
and irrational interpretive biases such as those observed in
depression and other mental disorders (Bill et al., 1991).

8

Encoding Biases and Depression
Beck (1967) proposed that depressed individuals seem to
show an unconscious negative perceptual bias that leads to
an overall pessimistic view of themselves, their
experiences, and the future.

Depressives are frequently

regarded as perceiving themselves and their environment in a
negative fashion.

Studies have consistently demonstrated

that depressed individuals exhibit pessimistic and hopeless
beliefs, and that they show a general negative bias in their
attributions about events (e.g., Abramson, Metalsky, &
Alloy, 1989; Alloy & Ahrens, 1987; Riskind, Rholes, Brannon,

& Burdick, 1987).
et al.

Given the findings of these studies, Hill

(1991) concluded that negative encoding rules appear

to be generally more accessible in individuals with
depressive symptoms (i.e., these individuals exhibit a
readiness to perceive information in a negatively biased
manner) .
Although the existence of a general negative bias and
its association with depression is wiaely accepted, little
is known about the cognitive origins of these negative
biases and why they gradually develop into pervasive
features of the way in which a depressed person interprets
reality (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979).
Hill et al.

According to

(1991), self-perpetuation processes may provide

a partial answer to this question.

During the early stages

of depression, even a slight increase in the readiness to
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use negative interpretive rules (e.g.,

~nothing

will ever

work out for me") may drive the individual to encode
ambiguous stimuli as more negative than they actually are.
Thus, this increased accessibility of negative encoding
categories may prompt depressed individuals to show a
stronger tendency to self-perpetuate encoding biases
involving negative information.
Indeed, Hill et al.

(1991)

found evidence for the

possibility of such a mechanism within depression.

They

exposed depressed and nondepressed participants to a series
of face diagrams containing a nonconsciously-salient
covariation between a facial feature and either a negative
or positive personality characteristic accompanying each
diagram.

Specifically, the location of the nostrils in the

face diagrams covaried with an accompanying personality
characteristic describing life satisfaction (i.e.,
"generally satisfied" or "generally

unsatisfied~).

Thus, in

one experimental condition, low nostril faces were always
described as satisfied and high nostril faces as
unsatisfied; in the other experimental condition, low
nostril faces were always described as unsatisfied and high
nostril faces as satisfied.

After this learning phase,

participants rated the degree of satisfaction of 80 new face
diagrams which did not contain any information supportive of
the covariation.

That is, personality information was not

provided during the testing phase.

Hill et al.

(1991)

10
expected that depressed participants would exhibit the selfperpetuating process, particularly for "unsatisfied"
covariations (i.e., when rating faces that were expected to
be classified as unsatisfied according to the respective
encoding rule) , due to the increased accessibility of the
negative personality feature

(i.e., dissatisfaction with

life) in depressed individuals.
As Hill et al.

(1991) predicted, depressed participants

learned the new encoding rule, "correctly'' perceiving the
height of the nostrils in the face diagrams in terms of life
satisfaction.

This pattern was especially observed for the

"unsatisfied personality

records.~

Also as predicted, the

influence of the newly-learned encoding rule on
participants' judgments increased over time.

Their ratings

during the second half of the testing phase (i.e., the last
40 trials) were more consistent with the covariation
acquired in the learning phase than the ratings during the
first half.

In addition, participants could not articulate

consciously what the covariation was despite their accurate
performance.
In summary, negative encoding rules may self-perpetuate
in depressed individuals, contributing to the development of
unconscious negative perceptual biases.
Personality Characteristics as Predispositions to Depression
Recent research in depression underscores a growing
convergence of opinion among theorists from different
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theoretical orientations regarding the association between
dependent or achievement personality traits and depression
(Arieti & Bemporad, 1980; Beck, 1983; Hammen, Ellicott, &
Gitlin, 1989).

According to Beck (1983), the dependent

(also known as aff iliative or sociotropic) type appears to
be more sensitive to social rejection, while the achievement
(also known as self-critical or autonomous) type seems to be
more sensitive to failure scenarios.

Persons with

dependency concerns usually need others for safety,
gratification, and support.

In addition, they tend to fear

social isolation, and they often seek reassurance from
others (Beck, 1983).

In comparison, persons with

achievement concerns tend to have their own internalized
standards for accomplishment, which are often higher than
the conventionally accepted norms.

Furthermore, such

persons tend to judge their own worth by their ability to
successfully fulfill specific expectations (Beck, 1983).
The association between personality style and vulnerability
to specific stressors is known as the congruency effect
(Segal, Shaw, Vella, & Katz, 1992).

According to this

hypothesis, a high degree of dependency concerns increases
the risk for a depressive reaction to a negative
interpersonal event (e.g., conflict, rejection) but not to a
negative achievement event (e.g., work or school problems)
Additionally, a high degree of achievement concerns is
proposed to present the opposite pattern of risk (Robins,
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Hayes, Block, Kramer, & Villena, 1995).
Studies of personality dimensions-event congruence have
yielded mixed results.

Some researchers have found support

for the congruency hypothesis for both the dependent and
achievement vulnerabilities (e.g., Hammen, Marks, Mayol, &
deMayo, 1985; Segal et al., 1992).

However, other studies

have found evidence only for one of the hypothesized
personality vulnerability factors.

For example, Clark,

Beck, and Brown (1992) found support only for dependency
vulnerability, while Hammen et al.

(1989)

found evidence for

the achievement vulnerability but for not the dependent one.
Although a variety of samples have been used (e.g., clinical
or nonclinical samples, cross-sectional or prospective
design), Robins et al.

(1995) claim that the differences in

findings do not seem to be systematically related to these
characteristics.

Finally, although researchers have

investigated the role of self-perpetuating encoding biases
among depressed individuals, no such studies have
additionally examined the congruency effect.

The present

study intends to examine vulnerability to specific
stressors, which, in turn, is hypothesized to increase the
risk of a depressive reaction.
The Present Study
In view of the above-mentioned considerations, the
present experiment examines whether individuals with
achievement and dependent personality characteristics differ
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in their ability to make judgments based on a newly acquired
encoding rule.

This experiment utilizes the stimulus

materials (i.e., computerized brain diagrams) used by
Lewicki et al.

(1989), for purposes of partial replication.

The study consists of a learning and a testing phase.
During the learning phase, participants were exposed to a
nonconsciously-salient covariation between an evaluatively
neutral feature of the brain diagram (i.e., a particular
ASCII character) and a particular situation with a negative
endpoint (e.g., having very few frienas or a low grade point
average, GPA) or a positive endpoint (e.g., having many
friends or high GPA) .

During the testing phase of the

experiment, participants were exposed to aclditional brain
diagrams with no covariation information and were asked to
make judgments for the stimuli (i.e., to judge whether the
brain diagram was indicative of someone with few or many
friends, or someone with a low or high GPA) .
Participants are expected to learn the encoding rule
presented in the learning phase of the stuay.

Based on the

self-perpetuation hypothesis, their judgments <luring the
testing phase are expected to become gradually more
consistent with the covariation learned in the first phase.
Specifically, participants are expected to "correctly"
perceive the brain diagrams according to number of friends
or GPA, and this effect is hypothesized to be more
pronounced during the second half of the testing phase

14

(i.e., the second segment of trials).
In addition, participants were classified into one of
the four following personality styles: dependent,
achievement (self-critical), dependent and achievement, or
neither dependent nor achievement.

The two types of

situations chosen for this study, number of friends and GPA
level, are presumed to represent interpersonal and
achievement concerns, respectively.

Based on the congruency

hypothesis, an interaction effect is predicted between the
four levels of personality subtypes and the situation to be
rated (friends or GPA).

That is, participants' judgments

are expected to differ depending on the match between their
personality subtype and the covariation condition involving
interpersonal or achievement concerns.

For example, the

ratings of ambiguous material by a dependent individual (an
individual more sensitive to social rejection) are predicted
to be more consistent with the previously learned
covariation when the encoding rule involves rating number of
friends rather than GPA level.
These predictions would support a vulnerability model
based on personality characteristics, which implies that
negative encoding biases occur independently of mood (i.e.,
encoding biases precede depressed mood) .

An

alternative

model is that negative encoding biases do not precede
depression, but are a consequence of depressive symptoms
(i.e., a mood-dependent processing style).

Jn order to test

15

this alternative, state-dependent model, encoding biases
were examined as a function of whether participants were
depressed or nondepressed (irrespective of personality
style).

That is, only depressed participants would be

expected to exhibit negative encoding biases, independent of
achievement or interpersonal concerns.

Specifically,

depressed individuals are predicted to be more accurate in
their ratings when covariations involve negative content
(very few friends, low GPA), while nondepressed individuals
are expected to be more accurate in their ratings when the
covariations involve positive content (many friends, high
GPA)
Given that Beck (1976) proposed that faulty information
processing observed in depressed individuals is automatic
(i.e., occurs nonconsciously), a strong test of his theory
involves the examination of encoding biases at a
nonconscious level.

Such a test is attempted in this study.

However, because the nonconscious effects found by Lewicki
et al.

(1989) were small (although statistically

significant), it was questionable whether the present study
would replicate their results.

Thus, a weaker test of

Beck's theory and the congruency effect would examine
participants' conscious processing of the covariation
information.

That is, in addition to examining nonconscious

information processing, participants' conscious recognition
of covariations are also examined.

Based on the congruency
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hypothesis, it is predicted that dependent participants
would be more likely to recognize consciously covariations
involving number of friends, whereas achievement-oriented
participants would be more likely to recognize consciously
covariations involving GPA.

Furthermore, to the extent that

information-processing is state-dependent (i.e., during
depression) and not a function of personality vulnerability,
it is predicted that depressed individuals would be more
likely to recognize consciously covariations involving
negative content (few friends, low GPA).

In contrast,

nondepressed individuals are predicted to recognize
consciously covariations involving positive content (many
friends, high GPA).

CHAPTER 2
METHOD
Participants
One hundred and sixty-one undergraduate students from
psychology classes at Loyola University of Chicago
participated in the study.

Fifteen participants were

dropped from the final sample due to their errors in
following the experimental procedure.

For example, some

participants inverted the rating scale (i.e., using the
lower half of the scale for ratings that required numbers
from the upper half of the scale), while others gave random
ratings during the learning phase against specific
instructions to use either the lower or upper halves of the
rating scale depending on the type of brain diagram to be
rated.

Thus, the final sample consisted of 146

participants, 90 females and 56 males.
Measures
Participants were asked to complete the Dysfunctional
Attitudes Scale, Form A (DAS-A) , a widely used measure of
beliefs underlying self-worth (Weissman & Beck, 1978; cited
in Beck, Brown, Steer, & Weissman, 1991), in order to
categorize individuals as having strong dependent or
achievement vulnerabilities.

The original DAS contains 100
17
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self-report items.

Abbreviated parallel 40-item forms, DAS-

A and DAS-B, have been developed using factor analysis.
Alternate-form reliability has been found to range between
.79 and .92

(Nelson, Stern, & Cicchetti, 1992; Oliver &

Baumgart, 1985).

In order to evaluate the ability of the

DAS-A to identify personality subtypes with hypothesized
vulnerabilities to depression, Cane, Olinger, Gotlib, and
Kuiper (1986) investigated the factor structure of the
measure with respect to the achievement and sociallydependent subtypes.

Using a sample of 664 university

students, they found that two major factors, performance
evaluation and approval by others, accounted for a large
proportion of the variance (61%) in the DAS scores.

As the

authors noted, the events hypothesized to precipitate
depression for the socially-dependent and self-critical
subtypes (disruption of personal relationships and failure
to meet personal goals and standards, respectively) are
similar to these two factors

(Cane et al., 1986).

In

addition, validation studies have found the test-retest
reliability of the total DAS to range between .73 and .84,
while internal consistency measures (i.e., coefficient
alphas) have ranged from .89 to .96 (Nelson et al., 1992;
Oliver & Baumgart, 1985; Weissman, 1979}.

Form A

coefficient alphas have been found to range between .85 and
.94

(Cane et al., 1986; Nelson et al., 1992; Oliver &

Baumgart, 1985).

Evidence for the discriminant validity of

19
the measure has been shown in the test's ability to
distinguish reliably between groups of depressed and
clinical control participants (Nelson et al., 1992).
Two additional measures, the Achievement Beliefs Scale
(ABS) and the Dependency Beliefs Scale (DBS), were used to
determine participants' achievement and dependency beliefs
(Persons, Burns, Perloff, & Miranda, 1993) .

Thus, a dual

criterion, based on the DAS, DBS, and ABS measures was used
to classify participants' personality subtypes.

Regarding

the validity of the ABS and DBS, Persons et al.

(1993)

examined the relationship between these scales and the
Personality Style Inventory (PSI) developed by Robins, Ladd,
Welkowitz, Blaney, Diaz, and Kutcher (1992; cited in Persons
et al., 1993).
correlated

Cx =

They found the DBS to be significantly
.61, Q < .01) with the PSI Sociotropy scale

and nonsignificantly correlated
Autonomy scale.

(~

= .25, ns) with the PSI

In addition, they found the ABS to be

correlated with the PSI Autonomy scale

(~

= .57, £ < .01)

However, the ABS was also correlated with the Sociotropy
scale of the PSI.

Persons et al.

(1993) pointed out, as a

possible explanation for this occurrence, that the
Sociotropy and Autonomy scales of the PSI overlap
considerably

Cx =

.62), while the overlap between the

Achievement Beliefs Scale and the Dependency Belief Scale
has been found to range between K= .20

and~=

.34.

present study, measures were completed after the

In the
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experimental task to prevent priming effects.
In order to classify individuals as depressed or
nondepressed, participants completed the Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI; Beck, 1967) following the experimental task.
This measure was selected because it has shown acceptable
levels of reliability and validity.

Test-retest reliability

for the BDI has been found to range in the .70s (Steer,
Beck, & Garrison, 1986) .

A meta-analysis performed by Beck,

Steer, and Garbin (1988) found the internal consistency of
the measure to range between .81 and .86.

Jn addition, the

construct and concurrent validities appear to be high (Beck
et al., 1988).

The mean correlations of the BDJ with

clinical ratings and the Hamilton Psychiatric Rating Scale
for Depression (HRSD) were found to be .72 and .73,
respectively, for psychiatric patients, and .60 and .74,
respectively, with nonpsychiatric participants (Beck et al.,
1988) .

In the present study, participants who scored 14 or

above on the BDI were assigned to the depressed group (N
24) and participants who scored less than 10 were classified
as not depressed (N

=

101), following Beck et al.'s (1988)

criteria for classifying at least moderate depression.
Design
In order to investigate the self-perpetuation
hypothesis and the congruency effect, the study consisted of
a 4 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design: 4 levels of
personality subtypes (achievement, dependent, achievement
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and dependent, and neither achievement nor dependent); 2
situations related to achievement or dependency (GPA and
number of friends, respectively); 2 segments of trials
during the testing phase (trials 1-40 and trials 41-80); 2
directions of covariation (between the neutral feature of
the stimulus and the situation; to be described below); 2
types of ratings (to be described below) .

Because

participants were randomly assigned to conditions combining
type of situation ratings and direction of covariation,
equal numbers (at least 10) of participants within each
personality subtype were expected in each cell of the
factorial combination.
Procedure and Materials
As previously stated, the present study employed some
aspects of the stimulus material chosen by Lewicki et al.
(1989) for the purpose of partial replication.

However,

given the nonsignificant results of our pilot study on a
sample of 160 participants using the parameters that Lewicki
and colleagues previously employed, some modifications were
made (to be explained below) .
Participants were instructed that the study was
concerned with how people form intuitive impressions of
digitized brain diagrams (see learning phase instructions in
Appendix A) .

The brain diagrams were computer-generated,

high-resolution graphics presented on a computer screen.
These were made up of eight types of ASCIJ characters (see
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Appendix B) .

The percentages of the different characters

making up the diagrams varied as follows: The character
chosen as the ''critical" one (ASCII code 178) was
manipulated according to two specific percentage levels (17%
or 4% of the brain scan) , while the percentages of the
remaining characters were allowed to vary randomly in order
to complete each diagram.

Thus, the two fixed percentages

of the critical character constituted two types of brain
diagrams.

The percentages among the remaining characters,

although allowed to vary randomly, were held within limits
in order to preserve the general shape and appearance of the
diagrams.
Lewicki et al.

(1989) determined that the difference

between the two types of brain scans was barely noticeable
and not salient when these contained
critical character, respectively.

17~

and 13% of the

That is 1 even when

participants were specifically instructed to focus on the
critical character, they had difficulty in correctly
classifying the two types of brains.
al.

However, Lewicki et

(1989) did report that participants nonconsciously were

able to differentiate the brain scans.

Nonconscious

processing was determined by the participants' accurate
performance in classifying the brain diagrams during the
testing phase, while being unable to report the basis for
their classification.

Our pilot testing, however, yielded

nonsignificant results using the 17 and 13 percentages.
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That is, there was no evidence that participants could
differentiate the brain scan containing 17% of the critical
character from the brain scan containing 13% of the critical
character at a conscious or a nonconscious level.
Therefore, the difference between the two percentages was
progressively increased during pilot testing until
participants found it to be not consciously salient, but at
least some participants were able to make correct judgments
nonconsciously.

This occurred when the two types of brain

scans contained 17% and 4% of the critical character,
respectively.
Each screen also included numbered x and y axes
(numbers also randomly generated) along which each diagram
was presented, providing additional (although meaningless)
information as a distractor (see Appendix B) .
The experiment consisted of a practice phase followed
by a testing phase.

Participants in each situation

condition (GPA or number of friends) were exposed to 36
computerized brain diagrams during the learning phase.

In

the achievement situation, 18 brain diagrams were explicitly
identified as "high grade point average (GPA)" and 18 as
"low grade point average (GPA)."

Similarly, participants in

the dependent situation received 18 brain diagrams
explicitly identified as [having]
as [having]

"many friends."

"very few friends" and 18

Thus, all participants received

information about brain diagrams involving the high endpoint
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(high GPA, many friends) and the low endpoint (low GPA, very
few friends) .

This repeated measures variable will be

identified henceforth as the direction of the rating (high,
low)
Additional instructions were given to 61 of the 146
participants in order to provide more meaning regarding the
situation for GPA or number of friends

(see Appendix A).

In

order to compare participants who received additional
instructions with those who received only the original
instructions,

~-test

analyses were performed for both

conscious and nonconscious awareness.

Results indicate that

participants did not differ on their ability to become
consciously or nonconsciously aware of the covariation as a
result of receiving the additional instructions.
Although the brain diagrams were generated randomly,
the screens presented during the learning phase contained a
systematic, nonconsciously-salient covariation between the
percentage of the critical character (4% versus 17%) in the
brain diagram and the explicitly identified situation
involving GPA or friends.

The situation information

appeared on the upper-right corner of the screen.
covariation condition contained two levels.

The

Par half of the

participants, the higher percentage of the critical
character (i.e., 17%) was explicitly identified with the
positive endpoint of the situation (high GPA or many
friends) , while the lower percentage

(4~)

was explicitly
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identified with the negative endpoint of the situation (low
GPA or very few friends) .

The remaining participants were

randomly assigned to the opposite covariations; the 4% brain
diagrams were identified with the positive endpoint, and the
17% brain diagrams with the negative endpoint of the
personality feature.

Thus, the type of brain diagram (4%

and 17%) was counterbalanced with the situation (positive
and negative endpoints) in a between-subject design.
Each record was displayed for 11 s, following the
protocol of Lewicki et al.

(1989).

During the practice

phase, participants were instructed to look at the situation
information (friends, GPA) and at the brain diagrams
presented on the computer screen to "get an intuitive feel"
for each person (see instructions in Appendix A) .
Lewicki et al.

As in

(1989), participants also were asked to rate

each diagram using an 8-point scale (by pressing one of
eight number keys on the computer keyboard) .

The scale was

divided into 4-point halves and labeled "High GPA" and "Low
GPA"

(or "Many Friends" /"Very Few Friends") at its

endpoints.

Thus, ratings of 1-4 represented a person who

has very few friends or a low GPA, and ratings of 5-8
represented a person who has many friends or a high GPA.

A

scale, rather than dichotomous ratings, was used to allow
participants to express their degree of confidence in their
judgments.

As the type of brain diagram

(q~

or l7%) and the

endpoints of the situation (low GPA/very few friends or high
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GPA/many friends) were counterbalanced, 4% brains either
required a low rating (i.e., between 1 and 4 for low GPA or
very few friends) or a high rating (i.e., between 5 and 8
for high GPA or many friends) depending on the condition.
Similarly, 17% brains either required a high or a low rating
depending on the condition to which participants were
randomly assigned.
Even though during the practice phase participants were
told whether the brain diagram characterizes a person with
high GPA (many friends) or low GPA (very few friends), they
were still asked to provide ratings.

Participants were told

that the purpose for making the ratings during the practice
phase was to familiarize themselves with the rating scale
and with the task in general.

They received no feedback

concerning the accuracy of their ratings.
During the testing phase of the experiment,
participants were exposed to 80 additional brain diagrams
(40 with 4% of the critical character and 40 with 17% of the
critical character); however, these diagrams were not
identified with regard to the level of the particular
situation (e.g.,

"high GPA" or "low GPA").

Participants

were asked to use their "intuition" to interpret the
diagrams and to rate them using the same 8-point scale as
described above.

Participants also were asked to respond

quickly, following their "first intuitive thought." and they
received no feedback concerning the accuracy of their
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ratings.

The ratings and response latencies 1 were recorded

by the computer.
After the experiment, participants completed a postexperimental questionnaire regarding their observations and
reflections pertaining to the stimulus material and the
strategies used (if any) to make the ratings during the
testing phase (see Appendix A for the questions used) .
Following the post-experimental questions, respondents
filled out the BDI, DAS, ABS, and DBS questionnaires.
Finally, participants were debriefed and allowed to ask
questions about the experiment.

1

Lewicki et al. (1989) expected participants to
respond faster during the second half of the testing phase.
Indeed, they found this to be the case.
However, they
explained this finding as a possible effect of ~unspecific
training" (p. 328). The present study also found
participants to respond significantly faster during the
second half of the testing phase. A significant (Q < .0001)
main effect of segment (i.e., trials 1-40 vs. trials 41-80)
was found for latencies for both achievement and dependent
groups.
Contrary to our findings, these investigators also
found that participants responded faster when rating
"intelligent" brains as opposed to "nonintelligent'' brains.
Whether this finding is due to a nonconscious
differentiation of the two types of brains or due to a
conscious response bias (in which favorable ratings are made
more quickly) is not clear.

CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
Sample Characteristics
Personality subtypes.

Table 1 displays descriptive

statistics of the scores for the entire sample on the ABS,
DBS, DAS (achievement and dependency subscales) , and BDI
questionnaires.

The means for the measures are, overall,

relatively low, indicating that the sample did not report a
substantial number of depressive symptoms or personality
characteristics associated with achievement and dependency
concerns, as assessed by the measures used.

Table 2

presents the correlations between the measures used.

The

results indicate that the achievement measures appear to be
more highly correlated (r = .718) than the dependency
measures (r = .419), indicating more convergent validity for
the achievement measures than for the dependency measures.
However, the results also highlight the intercorrelations
among measures of dependency and achievement concerns.
example, the highest correlation between achievement and
dependency measures was found between the ABS and the
dependency subscale of the DAS (r = .486).
The present study was designed to examine four
personality subtypes (i.e., dependent, achievement,
28
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Table 1
Mean, Standard Deviation, and Median Scores for Entire
Sample of Measures of Personality Characteristics and
Depression
Measure

M

SD

Median

ABS

1.515

0.781

1.

DBS

1.691

0.681

1.750

BDI

7.534

6.160

7.000

DAS-D

3.688

0.928

3.700

DAS-Ac

2.566

0.914

2.333

429

Note. N = 146. ABS =Achievement Beliefs Scale
(average score; scale endpoints: 1 = ~Disagree very
much," 4 ="Agree very much"); DBS= Dependency
Beliefs Scale (average score; scale endpoints: 1 =
"Disagree very much," 4 = "Agree very much") ; BDI
Beck Depression Inventory (total score; range = O
to 63); DAS-D = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale,
Dependency subscale (average score; scale
endpoints: 1 = "Totally disagree," 7 = "Totally
agree"); DAS-Ac = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scaler
Achievement subscale (average score; scale
endpoints: 1 = "Totally disagree, 11 7 = "Totally
agree") .
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Table 2
Correlation Matrix of Measures of Personality and DeQression
DAS-Ac

DBS

DAS-D

Measure

ABS

ABS

1.000

DAS-Ac

0.718

1.000

DBS

0.341

0.383

1.000

DAS-D

0.486

0.451

0.419

l.000

BDI

0.353

0.436

0.370

0.439

BDI

1.000

Note. ABS = Achievement Beliefs Scale; DBS = Dependency
Beliefs Scale; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; DAS-D =
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, Dependency subscale; DAS-Ac
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, Achievement subscale.
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dependent and achievement, and neither dependent nor
achievement) .

Participants with characteristics of both

personality subtypes were expected to be equally accurate in
response to judgments involving achievement or dependency
situations, while participants not possessing
characteristics of either personality subtype were not
expected to show sensitivity to either covariation.
A dual criterion was used to classify participants as
to the presence or absence of achievement and dependency
characteristics.

Participants' scores were required to fall

above the median for both the ABS and DAS-Achievement
measures in order to be classified as having achievement
concerns.

Similarly, participants' scores were required to

fall above the median for both the DBS and DAS-Dependency
measures in order to be categorized as having dependency
concerns.

Correspondingly, participants' scores were

required to fall below the median on both achievement or
both dependency measures in order to be assigned to the low
achievement or low dependency groups, respectively.
However, there were not enough participants per cell in each
group to consider four separate personality subtypes as a
result of the dual (more restrictive) criterion used (see
Table 3 for sample sizes and Table 4 for descriptive
statistics) .

Twenty-three participants were found to have

low scores on both characteristics (achievement

1

dependency) , while 11 participants were found to have high

32

Table 3
Sample Sizes for Personality Subtypes
Achievement
Dependency

Low

High

Low

23

7

High

3

ll

Note.
Subtypes classified according to dual
criterion.
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Table 4
Sample Size, Mean, Standard Deviation, and Median Scores of
Measures of Personality and Depression by Personality
Subgroup
Subgroup

M

SD

Median

ABS

0.789

0.420

0.714

DBS

0.929

0.378

1.000

BDI

2.826

2.498

2.000

DAS-D

2.696

0.581

2.700

DAS-Ac

1.612

0.343

1.600

ABS

1.095

0.360

1.413

DBS

1.958

0.072

2.000

BDI

2.667

3.786

1.000

DAS-D

4.000

0.436

3.800

DAS-Ac

1.778

0.567

2.000

ABS

2.000

0.369

2.143

DBS

0.786

0. 3 93

0.875

BDI

3.429

2. 992

3.000

DAS-D

2.857

0.648

2.900

DAS-Ac

2.692

0.700

2.667

n

Low Achievement/
Low Dependency

23

Low Achievement/
High Dependency

3

High Achievement/
Low Dependency

7
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Table 4

(continued)

M

SD

Median

ABS

2.247

0.737

2.143

DBS

2.227

0.457

2.125

BDI

6.000

2.236

7.000

DAS-D

4.573

0.454

4.800

DAS-Ac

3.673

0.941

3.200

Subgroup

n

High Achievement/
High Dependency

11

Note. ABS = Achievement Beliefs Scale (average score; scale
endpoints: 1 = "Disagree very much," 4 = "Agree very much");
DBS = Dependency Beliefs Scale (average score; scale
endpoints: 1 ="Disagree very much, 11 4 = "Agree very much");
BDI = Beck Depression Inventory (total score; range = O to
63); DAS-D = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, Dependency
subscale (average score; scale endpoints: l = "Totally
disagree," 7 ="Totally agree"); DAS-Ac= Dysfunctional
Attitudes Scale, Achievement subscale (average score; scale
endpoints: 1 = "Totally disagree, " 7 = "Totally agree") .
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scores on both characteristics.

Regarding high

dependency/low achievement and low dependency/high
achievement subtypes, only 3 and 7 participants,
respectively, were placed into each group.
Because of the inadequate cell sizes, the analyses
conducted examined two subgroups (high, low) for each
personality subtype (achievement, dependency): participants
who scored high (or low) on achievement concerns (i.e., on
both the ABS and the achievement subscale of the DAS)
regardless of their scores on dependency concerns and
participants who scored high (or low) on dependency measures
(i.e., on both the DBS and the dependency subscale of the
DAS) regardless of their scores on achievement subscales.
Tables 5 and 6 present descriptive statistics for the
achievement and dependent subgroups, respectively, included
in the analyses.

In order to test the vulnerability

hypothesis, participants with BDI scores above 9 were
excluded from the personality subgroups.

Thus, we examined

participants' ratings of the stimuli as a function of their
personality vulnerability, independent of current depressed
mood state.
Depressed and nondepressed groups.

In order to test

the state-dependent model, regardless of scores on
achievement and dependency measures, participants who scored
14 or above on the BDI were assigned to the depressed group

(N =

24) and individuals who scored less than 10 were
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Table 5
Sample Characteristics (Mean, Standard Deviation, Median) of
Achievement Subgroups Used in Statistical

Anal~ses

M

SD

Median

Low Achievement

0.839

0.395

0.857

High Achievement

2.182

0.556

2.143

Low Achievement

1.354

0.616

l.250

High Achievement

1.728

0.727

l.875

Low Achievement

3.542

2.775

3.000

High Achievement

5.034

2.809

5.000

Low Achievement

3.148

0.767

3.150

High Achievement

3.745

0.870

3.800

Low Achievement

1.739

0.368

1.733

High Achievement

3.308

0.764

3.067

Subgroup
ABS

DBS

BDI

DAS-D

DAS-Ac

Note. Low Achievement, N = 48; High Achievement, N = 29.
ABS = Achievement Beliefs Scale (average score; scale
endpoints: 1 ="Disagree very much," 4 ="Agree very much");
DBS = Dependency Beliefs Scale (average score; scale
endpoints: 1 = "Disagree very much," 4 ="Agree very much");
BDI = Beck Depression Inventory (total score; range = O to
63); DAS-D = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, Dependency
subscale (average score; scale endpoints: 1 = "Totally
disagree," 7 ="Totally agree"); DAS-Ac= Dysfunctional
Attitudes Scale, Achievement subscale (average score; scale
endpoints: 1 = "Totally disagree," 7 = "Totally agree") .
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Table 6
Sample Characteristics (Mean, Standard Deviation, Median) of
Dependent Subgrou:gs Used in Statistical Analyses
Subgroup

l'1

SD

Median

Low Dependency

1. 034

0.651

l.000

High Dependency

1. 857

0.694

l.714

Low Dependency

0.882

0.401

l.000

High Dependency

2.250

0.448

2.063

Low Dependency

3.324

2.825

3.000

High Dependency

5.682

2.901

7.000

Low Dependency

2.685

0.598

2.700

High Dependency

4.368

0.474

4.350

Low Dependency

1. 978

0.729

1.800

High Dependency

2.921

l.077

2.867

ABS

DBS

BDI

DAS-D

DAS-Ac

Note.
Low Dependency, N = 34; High Dependency, N = 22.
ABS = Achievement Beliefs Scale (average score; scale
endpoints: 1 ="Disagree very much," 4 ="Agree very much");
DBS = Dependency Beliefs Scale (average score; scale
endpoints: 1 = "Disagree very much," 4 ="Agree very much");
BDI = Beck Depression Inventory (total score; range = O to
63); DAS-D = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, Dependency
subscale (average score; scale endpoints: 1 = vTotally
disagree," 7 ="Totally agree"); DAS-Ac= Dysfunctional
Attitudes Scale, Achievement subscale (average score; scale
endpoints: 1 = "Totally disagree," 7 = "Totally agree") .
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designated as not depressed (N = 101), following Beck et
al.'s (1988) criteria for classifying at least moderate
depression.

Table 7 displays means, medians, and standard

deviations for depressed and nondepressed participants'
scores on the BDI, ABS, DBS, and DAS subscales.
Assessment of Conscious and Nonconscious Processing
Participants' conscious encoding was determined by
their ability to report the nature of the covariation
information they used to make ratings in the testing phase
of the study.

Thus, participants who became consciously

aware of the covariation between the correct ASCII character
and the situation presented with the brain diagrams during
the learning phase were expected to explicitly identify, in
the post-experimental questionnaire, the use of the critical
character as part of their strategy for rating brain
diagrams.

Additionally, conscious awareness of the

covariation would be demonstrated by a high degree of
accuracy in participants' ratings during the testing phase.
Nonconscious encoding was measured by examining the
accuracy of participants' ratings (i.e., ratings between 1
and 4 for brain diagrams reflecting few friends or low GPA,
and ratings between 5 and 8 for brain diagrams reflecting
many friends or high GPA) and the accuracy of participants'
(conscious) answers on the post-experimental questionnaire.
Thus, nonconscious encoding was presumed to take place when
participants' ratings were accurate (or

~correct''

given the
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Table 7
Mean, Standard Deviation, and Median Scores of Depressed and
Nondegressed Grougs

M

SD

Median

ABS

1. 338

0.744

1.286

DBS

1.556

0.697

1.625

BDI

4.208

2.971

4.000

DAS-D

3.420

0.849

3.400

DAS-Ac

2.344

0.859

2.200

ABS

2.024

0.737

2.143

DBS

2.057

0.454

2.125

BDI

18.250

4.316

17.500

DAS-D

4.325

0.813

4.350

DAS-Ac

3.278

0.837

3.233

Group

n

Nondepressed

101

Depressed

24

Note.
BDI total < 10 = Nondepressed; BDI total ~ 14 =
Depressed. ABS = Achievement Beliefs Scale (average score;
scale endpoints: 1 ="Disagree very much," 4 = 11 Agree very
much"); DBS = Dependency Beliefs Scale (average score;
endpoints: 1 ="Disagree very much," 4 = "Agree very much");
BDI = Beck Depression Inventory (total scorei range = O to
63); DAS-D = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, Dependency
subscale (average score; scale endpoints: l = "Totally
disagree," 7 ="Totally agree"); DAS-Ac= Dysfunctional
Attitudes Scale, Achievement subscale (average score; scale
endpoints: 1 = "Totally disagree," 7 = 11 Totally agree").
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learned encoding rule) but participants were unable to
articulate the nature of the covariation following the
experimental procedure.
Following the data analysis procedures established by
Lewicki et al.

(1989), the rating scale was dichotomized (1-

4 and 5-8) as "correct" or ''incorrect"

(depending on the

covariation condition) when determining participants'
''accuracy" in each segment, in order to control for
intrasubject response bias (i.e., being more likely to
assign high ratings than low ones) .

The dichotomized scale

was used for the analyses that examined the accuracy of
conscious and nonconscious processing, while the whole
rating scale was used for the analyses that examined
participants' ratings.

Also following the procedures

established by Lewicki et al.

(1989), the BO ratings

presented to each participant during the testing phase were
divided into two consecutive segments of 40 trials each.
Based on the self-perpetuation hypothesis, participants'
ratings were expected, on average, to be more consistent
with the covariation during the second segment than on the
first.
Analyses for Counterbalanced Variable: Type of Brain Diagram
As stated above, the type of brain diagram (4% and 17%)
was counterbalanced with the high or low endpoints of the
congruency situation in a between-subject design.

Thus,

brains with 4% of the critical character were paired with
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either the low endpoint of the situation (i.e., low GPA or
very few friends), thus requiring a low rating between 1 and
4, or the high endpoint (i.e., high GPA or many friends),
thus requiring a high rating between 5 and 8) .
Correspondingly, brains with 17% of the critical character
were paired with either the high or the low endpoints of the
congruency situation, also requiring high or low ratings,
respectively.
In order to compare counterbalancing conditions,
tests were performed.

~

Therefore, conditions 1 (17% high

GPA, 4% low GPA) and 2 (4% high GPA, 17% low GPA) were
compared on several dependent variables (scores on ABS, DBS,
BDI, DAS, ratings, response latencies, responses to the
post-experimental questionnaire, and gender).

Similarly,

conditions 3 (17% many friends, 4% very few friends) and 4
(4% many friends, 17% very few friends) were compared on the
same dependent variables.
expected.

No systematic differences were

In fact, the groups were found not to differ

across several dependent variables, suggesting that it was
appropriate to collapse across the counterbalancing
variables (i.e., covariation direction) for the remaining
analyses.

However, there were three comparisons that

yielded statistically significant differences between
groups.

Participants in conditions 1 and 2 were found to

differ on gender,

~(72)

=

2.216, £ < .05 (i.e., more females

than males in condition 2) and on one item from the post-
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experimental questionnaire dealing with a particular but
noncritical ASCII character.

Participants in condition 1

were more likely to indicate that they used the blank space
to distinguish the brain diagrams than individuals in
condition 2,

~(72)

= 2.158,

p <

.05.

Regarding conditions 3

and 4, participants were only found to differ on their
ratings for brain diagrams requiring high ratings (5-8)
during the second segment of the testing phase.

Namely,

participants in condition 3 made higher ratings than the
individuals in condition 4,

~(70)

= -2.100, £

<

.05.

It is

difficult to interpret why these results would occur, and
these significant differences were not expected to impact
the general interpretations of the results.
Analyses for the Congruency and Self-Perpetuation Hypotheses
Nonconscious processing using participants' ratings as
the dependent variable.

In order to test the congruency

hypothesis, an interaction was expected between
participants' personality subtype, the situation to be rated
(GPA, friends), and the direction of rating (high, low) .
Thus, participants' accuracy of judgments for GPA or number
of friends was expected to differ depending on the
personality subtype.

Based on the congruency hypothesis, it

was expected that the judgments of individuals with
achievement and dependent personality subtypes would be more
consistent, or accurate, with the learned covariations when
the ratings involved the GPA or the friends conditions,
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respectively.

In addition, based on the self-perpetuation

hypothesis, it was expected that participants' judgments
during the testing phase would gradually become more
consistent with the covariation "learned" in the first phase
of the study (i.e., participants' ratings would be more
accurate during the second segment of the testing phase) .
Support for the congruency hypothesis would be observed
in a three-way interaction involving personality subtype,
situation to be rated, and direction of rating.

Therefore,

a 2 (personality subtype: high or low) x 2 (situation to be
rated: GPA or friends) x 2 (direction of ratings: low or
high) ANOVA was calculated for each personality group
(achievement or dependent) , with repeated measures on the
last factor.

The direction variable is repeated because all

participants were exposed to brain diagrams with low GPA
(very few friends) and a high GPA (many friends) .

Support

for the self-perpetuation hypothesis would be obtained by a
2 x 2 interaction involving the direction of ratings (low,
high) and the segment (first 40 trials, second 40 trials)
variables.

If the congruency effect requires many trials to

develop (as in self-perpetuation of encoding biases), then a
significant four-way interaction would be expected.

Recall

that participants who scored 10 or above on the BDI were
excluded from the analyses.

Thus, individuals in the

personality groups were not depressed at the time of the
study, but were classified according to the presence of a
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vulnerability to depression based on dependency or
achievement concerns.
Regarding the self-perpetuation hypothesis, the results
indicate that the direction of rating x segment interaction
was not significant: f(l, 100)

=

1.673, Q

=

.199.

Therefore, participants did not become more accurate in
rating the brain diagrams during the second segment of the
testing phase.
Results also indicate that no evidence was found for
the congruency hypothesis.

The 2 x 2 x 2 (Personality

Subtype [High, Low] x Situation [GPA, Friends] x Direction
of Rating [Low, High]) ANOVA for participants' ratings
yielded a non-significant interaction for the dependent
personality group: f(l, 52)

=

1.345, 2

=

.252.

Similarly,

when the achievement group was used for the analysis, no
interaction was observed, f(l,

73) = .010,

~

= .922.

However, participants did correctly rate "low GPA/very few
friends" brains lower (i.e., brains diagrams received
ratings less than 5) than "high GPA/many friends 11 brains
(i.e., brains diagrams received ratings greater than 5).
Thus, a main effect for type of rating was found E(l, 52)
24.308, 2 < .0001 (when dependent subtypes were formed) and

f(l,

73) = 20.954, 2 < .0001 (when achievement subtypes were

formed).

When dependent groups were formed,

the mean rating

for the brain diagrams with the positive endpoint (high GPA,
many friends) was 5.314, and the mean rating for low-
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endpoint brain diagrams was 4.083.

Similarly, when

achievement groups were formed, the mean ratings for the
diagrams with the positive and negative endpoints were 5.208
and 4.302, respectively.

In sum, these results suggest that

participants' ratings were accurate.

The fact that

participants' accuracy did not interact with either
personality variable indicates that participants did not
make correct ratings on the basis of personality subtype
(i.e., high or low achievement/dependency).

Furthermore,

the situation that participants rated (GPA, friends) did not
influence whether they correctly judged the brain diagrams.
In order to determine whether the congruency effect
requires many trials to develop (as in self-perpetuation of
encoding biases), the four-way interaction was calculated.
The 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 (Personality Subtype [High, Low] x
Situation [GPA, Friends] x Direction of Rating [Low, High] x
Segment [First, Second]) ANOVA for participants' ratings
yielded a non-significant interaction for the dependent
personality group: E(l, 52) = 0.823,

~

= .368.

Similarly,

when the achievement group was used for the analysis, no
interaction was observed, E(l, 73) = 3.287, £ = .074.

Thus,

the findings did not provide evidence that the congruency
effect may require many trials to develop.
Nonconscious processing using accuracy of participants'
judgments as the dependent variable.

Nonconscious encoding

was presumed to take place when participants' ratings were
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accurate, given the learned encoding rule, but participants
were unable to articulate the nature of the covariation
(when answering the post-experimental questionnaire) .

Thus,

the congruency hypothesis was also tested by classifying
participants' judgments as "correct" or "incorrect" based on
their mean ratings falling within the 1-4 or 5-8 range, as
appropriate.

For the dependent personality group, no

evidence of nonconscious encoding was found as a function of
personality subtype (high or low) and situation to be rated
(GPA, friends),

X2 (1, N =

52) = .103, p = .748.

Results for

the congruency interaction were non-significant for the
achievement group as well,

X2 (1, N =

73)

.527, p = .468.

Conscious processing as a function of personality
vulnerability.

As explained above, conscious encoding was

determined by participants' ability to report the nature of
the covariation information they used to make ratings in the
testing phase of the study.

This information was expected

to be reported on the post-experimental questionnaire.

In

addition, conscious awareness of the covariation would be
demonstrated by a high degree of accuracy in participants'
ratings during the testing phase.

To test conscious

processing, the dependent variable was classified according
to "correct" and "incorrect" categories based on whether
participants correctly identified the covariation.
Personality subtypes, as defined by the ABS, DBS, and
DAS subscales did not appear to influence participants'
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ability to detect consciously the covariation between the
percentage of the critical character and the situation (GPA,
friends) .

The main effect of personality was not

significant for the dependent group,

= .147.

K2 (1, N =

42)

Similarly, a nonsignificant main effect of

personality was found for the achievement group,
59) = .038, 2

.846.

=

=

.787.

K2 (1, N =

No overall effect of situation to be

rated (GPA, friends) was found either,
.073, 2

2.10, 2

K2 (1, N =

114)

Regarding the congruency hypothesis, no

evidence of conscious encoding was found for the dependent
personality group as a function of personality subtype (high
or low) and situation to be rated (GPA or friends): X2 (1, N

= 42) = .718, 2

=

.397.

Similarly, no evidence of conscious

encoding was found as a function of personality subtype and
situation for the achievement personality group,
59)

=

1.039, 2

=

K2 (1, N =

.308.

State-Dependent Information Processing
Nonconscious processing using participants' ratings as
the dependent variable.

The preceding results indicate that

the congruency hypothesis was not supported.

Based on this

hypothesis, it was predicted that nondepressed participants
who were classified according to their vulnerability to
depression based on achievement and dependent personality
characteristics would learn the covariations for GPA and
friends,

respectively.

However, no effect of these

variables was observed for conscious or nonconscious
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processing of the covariation information.

An alternative hypothesis is that nonconscious and
conscious encoding of covariation information is influenced
by depressed mood state rather than vulnerability to
depression.

To test this hypothesis, participants were

classified as depressed if they scored 14 or higher on the
BDI

(N = 24) and nondepressed if they scored 9 or below (N

101)
In support of a state-dependent processing model, level
of depression (high, low) and direction of rating (1-4, 5-8)
were expected to influence participants' ratings.

Low

ratings (between 1 and 4) were always paired with the
negative endpoint of the situation to be rated (very few
friends, low GPA).

Similarly, high ratings (between 5 and

8) were always paired with the positive endpoint of the
situation to be rated (many friends, high GPA).

Therefore,

to the extent that information-processing is state-dependent
(i.e., during depression) and not a function of personality
vulnerability, it was predicted that depressed individuals
would be more accurate in their ratings when ratings
involved negative content, while nondepressed individuals
were expected to be more accurate in their ratings when
ratings involved positive content.

The main effect for

level of depression was found to be nonsignificant, f (l,
123) = .168,

~

= .683.

However, the main effect for

direction of rating yielded a significant result, £(1, 123)
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= 7.161, 2

<

The findings indicate that participants

.01.

were accurate in assigning high or low ratings to brain
diagrams as appropriate, but the level of depression had no
overall effect on the accuracy of participants' performance.
There was, however, a significant interaction between
level of depression and direction of rating, £(1, 123)
6.842, 2

=

.01.

=

Contrary to the state-dependent prediction,

depressed individuals did not differentiate nonconsciously
between the two types of brain diagrams.

Their ratings

indicate that they were inaccurate, as they rated each type
of brain equivalently (M

=

4.77 for positive endpoint

diagrams and M = 4.76 for negative endpoint diagrams).

In

contrast, nondepressed individuals accurately rated the two
types of brain diagrams (M
diagrams and M

= 4.27

=

5.18 for positive endpoint

for negative endpoint diagrams).

Thus, it appears that only nondepressed participants were
able to identify the covariation in the brain diagrams at a
nonconscious level.
If self-perpetuation of the encoding rule develops over
trials, then the segment variable should enter into a
significant interaction with level of depression and
direction of the ratings.

Thus, a 2 (level of depression:

high, low) x 2 (direction of ratings: 1-4, 5-8) x 2
(segment: first, second) A.NOVA was calculated with repeated
measures on the last two factors.

Results indicate that the

interaction was not significant: E(l, 123) = 1.417, Q =

50
.236.

Overall, these findings provide no evidence for the

hypothesis that negative encoding biases may be a
consequence of depressive symptoms (state-dependent model)
or for the hypothesis that these biases may develop over
time.
Nonconscious processing using accuracy of participants'
judgments as dependent variable.

Nonconscious processing in

the depressed and nondepressed groups (regardless of
personality subtype) was also examined by using a
dichotomous classification of participants' ratings as
correct or incorrect based on their mean ratings falling
within the 1-4 or 5-8 range, as appropriate (39.4% of
nondepressed participants were correct in their ratings,
while 50% of depressed participants were correct in their
ratings).

As with the personality groups, nonconscious

encoding was presumed to take place when participants'
ratings were accurate, given the learned encoding rule, but
participants were unable to articulate the nature of the
covariation (in answering the post-experimental
questionnaire) .

No evidence was found for nonconscious

encoding as a function of level of depression, X2 (1,
123)

=

.863, 2

=

N=

.353.

Conscious processing as a function of level of
depression.

As described above, conscious encoding was

determined by participants' ability to report the nature of
the covariation information used to make ratings in the
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testing phase of the study.

In addition, conscious

awareness of the covariation would be demonstrated by a high
degree of accuracy in participants' ratings during the
testing phase.

Once again, the dependent variable was

classified according to ''correct" and "incorrect" categories
based on whether participants correctly identified the
covariation or were incorrect in their identification (17.3%
of nondepressed participants correctly identified the
covariation, while 4.8% of the depressed participants were
correct in their identification of the covariation) .
Level of depression, as assessed by the BDI, did not
appear to influence participants' ability to detect
consciously the covariation between the percentage of the
critical character and the situation (GPA, friends) .

No

evidence of conscious encoding was found for the depression
subgroups as a function of level of depression (high or
low),

K2 (1, N =

102) = 2.085, £ = .149.

CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION
The purpose of the present study was to provide a
possible explanation for the cognitive origins of negative
encoding biases, including their relation to individuals'
personality characteristics, and their dependence on, or
independence from, depressed mood.

However, the present

study found no support for the development of encoding
biases, either at a conscious or nonconscious level, as a
function of vulnerability to stressors based on achievement
and dependent personality characteristics.

Furthermore, the

present study found no evidence for the development of
encoding biases, either consciously or nonconsciously, as a
function of depressed mood state.
An additional purpose consisted of partially
replicating Lewicki et al.'s (1989) findings on the selfperpetuating development of encoding biases.
were not replicated in the present study.

These findings

Nondepressed

participants did, however, make correct judgments at a
nonconscious level regarding the covariations across all
trials.

Thus, in the present study, these participants

seemed to accurately rate the brain diagrams throughout the
entire testing phase, and did not require trials for the
52
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encoding bias to develop over time.

A possible explanation

for the lack of evidence regarding self-perpetuation is that
the difference between the percentages of the critical
character used in the present study (17% and 4%) may have
been more salient to participants than the difference
between 17% and 13% used by Lewicki et al.

(1989).

Thus,

the encoding bias in the present study may not have required
trials to develop over time.
Some problematic methodological and conceptual issues
may have influenced the results.

In broad terms, they

relate to problems with the present study and problems with
encoding studies in general.

Four main issues will be

addressed in the following discussion.

First, the measures

used in the present study to classify participants as having
dependency or achievement concerns may not have accurately
captured distinct characteristics of the personality
subtypes.

Second, the manipulation in the present study

involving GPA and number of friends may not have adequately
primed the personality vulnerability.

Third, some aspects

of Lewicki et al.'s (1989) findings may be questionable, in
particular, the accuracy of participants' ratings and the
clinical significance of the study's findings.

Last, not

only may encoding effects be difficult to achieve but the
congruency effect may also be found at a different step in
the processing of information.
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Construct Validity of the Measures
The personality measures used in the present study may
not have validly assessed dependency and achievement
concerns.

Furthermore, the two subtypes may not be distinct

and mutually exclusive personality characteristics (Coyne &
Whiffen, 1995) .

Regarding the divergent validity of the

measures, the dependency and achievement subscales of the
DAS, for example, were found to be considerably correlated
(~

=

.541).

That dependency and achievement concerns are

related is promoted by Coyne and Whiffen (1995), who review
findings that consider the possibility of autonomy (i.e.,
achievement) and dependency concerns as potential dimensions
of personality occurring within the same individual, rather
than as independent traits.

Thus, it may be inappropriate

to differentiate dependent and achievement types, and
instead, researchers should determine individuals' relative
position on these dimensions.

Due to small cell sizes, the

present study was unable to compare participants according
to their relative position on the dependency and achievement
dimensions (i.e., high achievement/high dependency, high
achievement/low dependency, low achievement/high dependency,
low achievement/low dependency) .

Instead, the present study

classified participants according to their scores (high or
low) on the dependent (or achievement) characteristic,
regardless of their score on the other personality
dimension.
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In terms of the criteria used for the classification of
personality subtypes, the low convergent validity between
the DBS and the dependency subscale of the DAS

<x

= .419)

may have affected the utility of using a dual criterion.

In

addition, median splits were used to classify participants'
scores into high or low groups.

Coyne and Whiffen (1995)

point out that the use of this technique creates an
arbitrary cutpoint that does not change the continuous
nature of the variable in question.

They also point out

that individuals who score above the cutpoint are typically
treated as identical, regardless of the difference in their
scores, while individuals who are close in scores but on
opposite sides of the cutpoint are treated as different.
Therefore, other classification techniques may be adopted by
future studies to account for the continuous nature of the
personality variables in question.
Stress and Activation of Vulnerability
Another problematic conceptual issue related to the
personality measures used in the present study was
highlighted by Coyne and Whiffen (1995) .

After reviewing

the research on the congruency hypothesis, Coyne and Whiffen
(1995) suggest that serious life stress and stable
contextual factors may affect the validity of measures that
intend to assess stable personality traits.

They propose

that measures of dependency and achievement concerns may
reflect stable, trait-like characteristics, as well as the
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effect of stressful life circumstances and other situational
factors present at the time of measurement (Coyne & Whiffen,
1995) .

Thus, future studies of personality vulnerability

would benefit from the additional assessment of current life
stress.
Regarding the activation of the vulnerability, the
particular situations used in the present study (GPA, number
of friends) may not have been stressful enough to prime the
achievement and dependency personality subtypes.

Thus,

future studies may test the vulnerability hypothesis by
manipulating a stressful event, such as an achievement or
interpersonal failure, and then test the nonconscious or
conscious processing that may contribute to the aevelopment
of encoding biases.
Findings by Lewicki's Group
A possible problem related to the findings in the
present study concerns previous research conducted in this
area.

Lewicki et al.'s (1989) findings, while statistically

significant, may have little clinical significance.

The

differences found in accuracy of participants' ratings were
small.

The largest difference in ratings for ''intelligent"

and "nonintelligent" brain diagrams occurrea during the
second segment of trials.

Specifically, Lewicki et al.

(1989) found mean ratings to fall around 4.81 (for
nonintelligent brain diagrams) and around 4.97 (for
intelligent brains diagrams).

Thus, given the small
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magnitude of the difference in mean ratings, these findings
may be difficult to replicate.
It should also be noted that the average ratings
reported by Lewicki et al.

(1989) are below 5 1 even for

brain diagrams that required correct ratings between 5 and 8
(i.e. , those diagrams labelled as "intelligent 11

)

This

•

finding suggests that, contrary to Lewicki's et al.'s (1989)
conclusions, participants did not learn the covariation
between the intelligence condition and the critical
character in the brain diagrams.

The present study found

that participants did learn the encoding rule presented in
the learning phase; however, this learning appears to have
occurred independently of personality characteristics.

In

terms of the depressed and nondepressed distinction, only
nondepressed participants appeared to have learned the
encoding rule.
Encoding Effects
Another possible explanation for the results found in
the present study relates to general problems of encoding
studies.

Gotlib, McLachlan, and Katz (1988)

suggest that

the congruency effect may not be found at encoding, but at a
different step in the processing of information.

The

present study hypothesized that, if the development of
negative encoding biases depends on depressed mood state,
participants would be more accurate in rating brain diagrams
paired with negative situations (low GPA 1 very few friends)
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than diagrams paired with positive situations (high GPA,
many friends).

Gotlib et al.

(1988) found that, contrary to

predictions, depressed participants did not attend to
negative stimuli more frequently than to positive or neutral
stimuli.

In attempting to explain the obtained results,

Gotlib et al.

(1988) suggested that negative biases may be

found in later stages of processing (i.e., recall) rather
than in earlier ones (i.e., attention).

The same

explanation may be applied to the findings in the present
study.
Gotlib et al.

(1988) offered an additional suggestion

for their findings, explaining the results according to a
model of attention referred to as

11

zoom lens 11

Yeh, 1985; cited in Gotlib et al., 1988).

(Ericksen

&

This model states

that attention can be thought of as a zoom camera.

Assuming

that attention is allocated along a dimension, attention may
be deployed widely, at a cost in resolution, or narrowly,
with high resolution.
Gotlib et al.

In applying this model to their data,

(1988) suggest that depressed participants may

have deployed attention widely at a cost in resolution,
while nondepressed participants may have focused their
attention more narrowly, with better resolution.

Similarly,

the zoom lens model may explain why nondepressed
participants in the present study were able to learn the
covariation while depressed participants, who may have
attended to a wider range of stimuli, were not able to do
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so.
The results of the present study indicate that
individuals with moderate depressed symptoms did not learn
the covariation, while nondepressed individuals did appear
to learn the covariation.

It is also possible that the

ability to learn covariation information from the
environment may be a deficit in depression (i.e., depressed
individuals may lose the ability to attend to, process, or
remember information) .

Furthermore, this deficit may be due

to cognitive or motivational factors.

However, this

question cannot be determined with the data in the present
study.
In conclusion, the present study, while limited,
attempted to contribute to the research examining the role
of cognitive factors in depression, as well as the research
investigating the association between personality
characteristics and particular stressors.

Contrary to the

state-dependent model, depressed individuals were less
likely to encode a covariation rule regarding particular
events.

Instead, depressed individuals were unable to learn

the covariation in the stimuli, suggesting that, rather than
possessing a nonconscious sensitivity to negative
information, these individuals were insensitive to the
subtle covariations in the stimuli.

This apparent lack of

sensitivity appears consistent with the wide lens/low
resolution concept described by the zoom lens model.

APPENDIX A
INSTRUCTIONS TO PARTICIPANTS AND POST-EXPERIMENTAL
QUESTIONNAIRE
Instructions to Practice Phase
(Instructions for the dependent situation were identical,
except for the situation to be rated. Each participant was
given a copy of the instructions. Once participants
finished reading the instructions, the experimenter reviewed
them orally.)
This study is concerned with how people form intuitive
impressions of digitized brain diagrams.
During this
experiment you will be shown brain diagrams such as the one
attached [a copy of the diagram presented in Appendix B will
be provided] . The first part of the study is a practice
phase, and thus, we would like to familiarize you with the
task. A personality characteristic will appear on the upper
right hand corner of the screen along with each diagram that
is presented, indicating whether the diagram reflects a
person who has a high grade-point average (GPA) or a person
who has a low GPA.
Please look at the upper right hand corner of the screen
first to see what kind of person is represented, and then
look at the diagram.
Examine the diagram and try to gain an
intuitive feeling (a "gut feeling") for the person based on
the personality characteristic and other information
presented on the computer screen. The intuitive feelings
you develop in this practice phase will be tested later.
Because the computers are slow, it takes some time for the
whole scan to appear on the screen. Some adjustments will
occur on the brain diagrams (especially at the top) but
these have nothing to do with the experiment.
In order to familiarize you with the rating scale, please
use the number keys labeled on the computer key board (1
through 8) to indicate whether the brain diagram reflects a
person who has a high or a low GPA. During these initial
practice trials, you can be confident that when we tell you
a person has a high GPA, you should give that person a
rating of 5 through 8. A person with low GPA should receive
a rating of 1 through 4.
1

2

3

5

4

Low GPA

6

7

High GPA
60

8
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IMPORTANT: Please be patient with the computer and wait for
the next diagram to appear after you make a rating. You
will see the phrase "Press any key to continue" after
several brain diagrams have been presented.
Please raise
your hand at that point, before you proceed.
Assessment of Comprehension of Instructions
In order to make sure that everyone is using the
instructions in the same way, we would like you to answer
the following questions:
1.

This study is about
(a) Intuition
(b) Telepathy
(c) Dream analysis

2.

The confidence scale has

points.

3.
Please write in the characteristics that correspond to
the endpoints of the scale.
1

2

3

4

5

If you have any questions or if
ask the experimenter before you
Please raise your hand when you
(Subjects will be instructed to
this point.)

6

7

8

things are not clear, please
proceed.
are done.
begin the practice phase at

Instructions to Testing Phase
(To be given to participants at the end of the practice
phase.)
Now you will see some additional brain diagrams. This time
we won't be providing you with any personality information
about the person. Based on the personality information
previously presented, we now would like you to rely on your
intuition to rate whether the person has a high GPA or a low
GPA.
Please use the 8 keys labeled on the computer keyboard,
which form an eight-point scale, to indicate whether the
person has a high GPA or a low GPA. Your confidence in your
intuition may vary. Ratings of 1 through 4 would reflect a
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person who has a low GPA, while ratings of 5 through 8 would
reflect a person who has a high GPA.
2

1

3

4

Low GPA

5

6

7

8

High GPA

You may not know why you are making a particular rating but
that is how your intuitive feelings may work. Try to get a
general feeling of whether the person has a high or low GPA
by relying on your intuition (or "gut feeling~), and
respond quickly, following your first intuitive thought.
Additional Instructions on Personality Characteristics
(GPA condition)
People who have a high GPA
-may be concerned with academic failure
-tend to expect above-average performance
-may avoid taking risks for fear of making mistakes
-may be reluctant to ask for help
People who have a low GPA
-may not set high standards for themselves
-often feel they can enjoy an activity regardless of the end
result
-may not necessarily feel inferior if they display weakness
-generally are not upset when they make mistakes
(Friends condition)
People who have many friends
-may find it difficult to be alone
-are often good at avoiding any disagreements and conflicts
with people
-tend to be concerned with what others think about them
-work hard to maintain relationships with people at all
costs
People who have very few friends
-may feel that their own opinions of themselves are more
important than others' opinions
-often feel that they don't get enough love or respect from
others as they deserve
-may not necessarily rely on other people for support and
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encouragement
-may prioritize their own needs and wants above those of
others
Post-Experimental Questionnaire
(To be answered by participants at the end of the testing
phase.)
Please spend a few minutes answering the following
questions. We are interested in your observations and
impressions about the task you just completed.
1) How did you go about making your ratings?
2) Which particular aspects of the brain diagrams did you
pay attention to?
(The first two questions will be on a separate sheet to
prevent participants from being influenced by the questions
that follow.)
3) When you were making the ratings, did you consider any of
the following as possibilities:
(please circle YES or NO)
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

the shape of the diagrams
the size of the diagrams
the x axis
the y axis
the shading
the color of the screen
a general/intuitive feeling

If so, please explain.
4) At any time, did you make your decision (your ratings)
based on:
(please circle YES or NO)
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

the
the
the
the
the
the

shape of the diagrams
size of the diagrams
x axis
y axis
shading
color of the screen
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g)

YES

NO

a general/intuitive feeling

If so, please explain.
5) The brain diagrams were made up of particular symbols.
Did you pay attention to any of the symbols to make your
ratings?
If so, circle which one(s) and explain how you used the
symbol(s).

b)

I
II

g)

I
I

c)

"blank space"

h)

~

i)

I

a)

f)

d)
e)

•

j )

6) When you were making your ratings, did you pay attention
to the following areas of the brain diagrams:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

the
the
the
the
the

left side
right side
middle
top
bottom

If so, circle which one(s) and explain how you used the
information.
7) Did you try any other strategies to make your ratings?
If so, please explain.
8) Do you have any additional comments or observations about
the brain diagrams or the procedure of the experiment?

APPENDIX B
SAMPLE OF COMPUTERIZED BRAIN DIAGRAM

Note.

Arrow indicates critical ASCII character.
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